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COMMENTS
PATIENT AWARENESS DURING GENERAL
ANESTHESIA: A LEGAL GUIDE
The surgeon ... made an incision [and] I could hear my skin
tearing like a piece of paper. [I]t felt like someone had stuck a
blow torch in my stomach.'
Imagine being in surgery when the surgeon believes you are fully anes-
thetized. In reality, however, you are completely aware and alert. Your
mind is racing. You fear that since you can hear the surgeon's conversa-
tions and feel his fingers on your body, no doubt you will feel the inci-
sions as well. In addition, you feel like you are suffocating because the
respirator does not let you breathe as much air as you want.
You try to tell the surgeon that you are awake, but to no avail. You are
unable to move your hands or legs, you cannot cry, blink, or give any
indication that you are awake. You become terrified, because you as-
sume something must be terribly wrong.
You then hear the surgeon ask for a scalpel. You try to beg and scream
for him to stop but no sound comes out of your mouth. The surgeon
finally makes the incision and you feel like you are going to explode. The
pain is inconceivable. You want to die rather than continue with the op-
eration. You feel violated and deceived.
After the operation, you confront the surgeon and anesthesiologist to
tell them about the horror you experienced. Instead of being sympa-
thetic, however, they refuse to believe you and insist that you merely ex-
perienced a bad dream as a result of the anesthetic agents that were
administered. To your dismay, they attempt to assure you that it was just
not possible for you to be aware during the operation. You feel helpless
and alone because no one seems to believe you.
A short time later, you begin experiencing frequent and recurrent
nightmares, re-living the operation over and over again. You can no
1. Jeanette Tracy, Awareness in the Operating Room: A Patient's View, in MEMORY
AND AWARENESS IN ANESTHESIA 349, 350 (Peter S. Sebel ed., 1993) (reflecting on her
painful experience during a hernia repair operation in 1990).
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longer do the simplest tasks, such as reading, working, or writing. Life
never seems to be the same.
The description above2 is common among patients who suffer "aware-
ness" 3 during general anesthesia. It is estimated that about 0.2 to 1% of
all persons undergoing general anesthesia experience "awareness" during
surgery.' In the United States, this may affect as many as thirty thousand
persons annually.5
This Comment will focus on the frightening prospect of patient "aware-
ness" during surgery, and will suggest some legal pathways a lawyer can
take on behalf of a client who experiences this phenomenon. First, anes-
thesiology will be defined. Second, the impact "awareness" may have on
patients will be explored. Third, the possible causes of patient "aware-
ness" will be discussed. Fourth, anesthesiologists' duties and obligations
to their patients when conducting surgery will be examined. Fifth, theo-
ries of recovery for damages caused by awareness will be discussed. Fi-
nally, this Comment will consider ways in which anesthesiologists can
protect themselves from lawsuits before, during, and after' operations.
This Comment concludes that the continued threat of legal liability will
ensure the best possible care for patients, thereby reducing the likelihood
of patient awareness and increasing the overall safety of patients.
I. ANESTHESIOLOGY DEFINED
Anesthesiology is defined as the "practice of medicine dealing with...
the management of procedures for rendering a patient insensible to pain
and emotional stress during surgical, obstetrical and certain [other] medi-
cal procedures."6
2. The scenario described is adapted from Jeanette Tracy's personal account of her
experience during surgery for a hernia removal. Id. at 349-53; Interview with Jeanette
Tracy, "awareness" victim, in Fairfax, Va. (Oct. 15, 1995); Dateline NBC: Rude Awakening
(NBC television broadcast, Oct. 27, 1996).
3. "Awareness" has been defined as the "quality or state of being aware; i.e., watch-
ful, vigilant, informed, cognizant, or conscious." M. M. Ghoneim & Robert I. Block,
Learning and Consciousness During General Anesthesia, 76 ANESTHESIOLOGY 279, 280
(1992).
4. Jane Stevens, Rude Awakening: Imagine the Horror of Waking Up During Surgery
and Feeling Every Move. It Happens., L.A. TiMEs, Sept. 13, 1994, at E3; Ghoneim and
Block, supra note 3, at 282; Stephen F. Dierdorf, Awareness During Anesthesia, 14 ANES-
THESIOLOGY CLINiCS N. AM. 369, 371 (1996).
5. Charles McLeskey & Alan Aitkenhead, Prevention of Awareness, AM. Soc'Y AN-
ESTHESIOLOGISTS NEWSL., Oct. 1994, at 16, 16.
6. Gerald J. Todaro, Anesthesia Malpractice: What Are the Anesthesiologist's Duties?,
TRIAL, May 1986, at 32. Other definitions of anesthesiology include: (1) the support of life
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General anesthesia, the practice of putting a patient to sleep during
surgery, can be induced either by administering gaseous agents orally or
by injecting anesthetic agents intravenously.7 The goal of general anes-
thesia is to render the patient unconscious, and free from pain.' Muscle
relaxants are often used in conjunction with the anesthetic agents for
three reasons:9 first, to relax the patient's muscles so that the surgeon can
cut tissue more easily;' ° second, to ensure that the patient does not move
during the operation;" and third, to block pain so that as the patient
sleeps, the body does not produce stress hormones to stimulate the pa-
tient's nerves. 12 In effect, the muscle relaxants render the patient com-
pletely paralyzed. Because this paralysis often affects the patient's
respiratory muscles as well, the patient must be supplied with oxygen arti-
ficially through endotracheal intubation.' 3
functions under the stress of anesthetic and surgical manipulations, id.; and, (2) loss of the
ability to feel pain, caused by administration of a drug or by other medical interventions.
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 74 (28th ed. 1994). There are two main
types of anesthesia: regional (which allows a localized area of the body to be operated on
without necessitating loss of consciousness), and general (which induces the patient to lose
consciousness while the operation is performed). See Gerald Todaro & Frank Todaro, An-
esthesia Malpractice, 6 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3 1, 18-19 (1989). See James Bartimus &
Marilyn Dymer, Evaluating Anesthesia Negligence Claims, TRIAL, May 1992, at 38, 40.
7. Bartimus & Dymer, supra note 6, at 40. General anesthesia can be induced by
administering intravenously a rapidly acting barbiturate, or by administering a mixture of
anesthetic and oxygen through inhalation. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 17. "Most
often both [oral and intravenous agents] are used, along with narcotics for pain relief and
muscle relaxants." Bartimus and Dymer, supra note 6, at 40. After the initial induction,
the anesthetic level is normally maintained with a mixture of nitrous oxide gas and oxygen
at a iatio of 70% nitrous oxide to 30% oxygen. Id. If an inadequate amount of oxygen is
administered, the patient's blood can become insufficiently oxygenated (hypoxic) which, if
not corrected, can lead to severe brain damage or even death. Todaro & Todaro, supra
note 6, at 18; William H. L. Dornette, Some Problems Related to Specific Agents and Tech-
niques, in LEGAL ISSUES IN ANESTHESIA PRACTICE 159, 162 (William H. L. Dornette ed.,
1991). Nitrous oxide is a good pain reliever, but a weak anesthetic; it is therefore supple-
mented with more potent anesthetic gases to induce a deeper sleep. Bartimus & Dymer,
supra note 6, at 40.
8. See A. R. Aitkenhead, Editorial: Awareness During Anaesthesia: What Should the
Patient be Told?, 45 ANAESTHESIA 351, 351 (1990).
9. Judy Foreman, This Is No Time to Wake Up, But Many Do, BOSTON GLOBE, May
1, 1995, at 29.
10. Id.
11. See Bartimus & Dymer, supra note 6, at 40.
12. Foreman, supra note 9, at 29.
13. Bartimus & Dymer, supra note 6, at 40. During intubation, a tube is passed
through the patient's windpipe to his lungs. Id. The primary purpose for it "is to prevent
the unconscious patient from inhaling vomit, blood, mucous, or saliva into the lungs." Id.
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II. IMPACT OF AWARENESS ON THE UNSUSPECTING PATIENT
A patient undergoing general anesthesia 14 expects to be unconscious,
free from pain and unpleasant sensations during the surgical procedure.' 5
When this does not occur, the patient may become extremely dis-
tressed.16 Apart from the intense pain that may be experienced during
the operation, the victim may also become severely traumatized due to
the lack of control over the procedure.' 7 This lack of control can be ex-
tremely frightening when lying passively on the operating table, believing
things must be terribly wrong.' 8 In addition, the patient's inability to
move or communicate with the surgeon because of the muscle relaxants
only adds to the terror.'9
With complete failure of the anesthesia, the patient may know where
he is and what is happening, hear conversations, and feel pain.2" It is also
possible, though less common, for the patient to recall seeing the opera-
14. General anesthesia usually involves the following four components:
(1) a mild tranquilizer to make the patient forget the surgical experience; (2) nar-
cotics to block the pain; (3) an anesthetic like Sodium Pentothal or Propofol, to
make them lose consciousness; and (4) an agent that paralyzes patients so that
they will not move during the operation when the surgeon severely stimulates
their nerves.
Stevens, supra note 4, at E4.
15. Aitkenhead, supra note 8, at 351.
16. See N. Moerman et. al., Awareness and Recall during General Anesthesia, 79 ANES-
THESIOLOGY 454, 462 (1993).
In a study of 26 patients who experienced awareness during general anesthesia, the authors
reached the following conclusion:
The actual awakening during an anesthetic does not seem to be the most distres-
sing experience for patients .... [B]ut when they found themselves "unable to
move their arms and legs or open their mouths," without being able to communi-
cate, this resulted in great anxiety and panic. Furthermore, the inability to inter-
pret what was going on, and the sensation that "something must be completely
wrong," contributed to the anxiety. Some patients reported fears of impending
death, but others denied such feelings and said that they had been far more con-
cerned about experiencing pain.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 289.
19. Id.
20. J.E. Utting, Awareness: Clinical Aspects, in CONSCIOUSNESS, AWARENESS AND
PAIN IN GENERAL ANESTHESIA 171, 172-173 (M. Rosen & J.N. Lunn eds., 1987); see also
Christopher Heneghan, Clinical and Medicolegal Aspects of Conscious Awareness During
Anesthesia, 31 INT'L ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS 1, 2 (1993) (stating that "patients have
recalled intubation, abdominal incision, conversation both relevant and irrelevant to the
operation, feeling hands inside them, instruments moving, and of course skin suturing").
Id.
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tion.21 The patient may be conscious from a few seconds to an hour or
more.22 Not surprisingly, most patients consider this a horrifying
experience.23
Patient awareness may take the form of implicit or explicit memory.24
Implicit memory occurs when the patient retains details from the surgery,
but cannot consciously recollect them. 2 At the extreme, these patients
may suffer from acute depression,26 but not realize why until hypnosis or
other detailed psychological testing is conducted.27 Explicit memory, in
contrast, is characterized by the presence of information which the pa-
tient consciously remembers after the operation.21 It is this type of mem-
ory which is usually referred to as patient "awareness. '29
Conscious memory of the operation can lead to Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder ("PTSD") which is normally evidenced by sleep disturbances,
dreams, flashbacks, and anxiety. 30 PTSD arises when persons are ex-
posed to enormous psychological stress and terror which overwhelm their
system.31 According to experts, patients experiencing "awareness" fre-
quently develop a traumatic neurosis.32
They show clinical features of both anxiety and depression; they
have recurrent nightmares in which they may re-live their exper-
iences; they are afraid to go to sleep because they fear the night-
mares or fear that they may die before they wake up; when they
do wake up they may find themselves frantically trying to puzzle
out whether they are alive or dead.... Symptoms may last for a
year or more and may be accompanied by varying degrees of
anxiety and/or depression.33
21. Utting, supra note 20, at 172-73.
22. Id. at 173.
23. Id.
24. McLeskey & Aitkenhead, supra note 5, at 16.
25. Id.; see also Dawn P. Desiderio, Patient Awareness Under General Anesthesia, 11
CANCER INVESTIGATION, 185, 185 (1993) (stating that such memory is not directly retrieva-
ble but requires triggering, exposure, or priming through past experience).
26. A.D. Macleod & E. Maycock, Awareness During Anaesthesia and Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder, 20 ANAESTHESIA & INTENSIVE CARE, 378, 379-80 (1992); A.R. Aitken-
head, Conscious Awareness, in CONSCIOUSNESS, AWARENESS AND PAIN IN GENERAL AN-
ESTHESIA, supra note 20, at 386, 390.
27. I.
28. See Desiderio, supra note 25.
29. McLeskey & Aitkenhead, supra note 5, at 16.
30. Id. at 17.
31. See Heneghan, supra note 20, at 2; Macleod & Maycock supra note 26, at 379.
32. Utting, supra note 20, at 173.
33. Id.; see also Mary Jo Peebles, Through a Glass Darkly: The Psychoanalytic Use of
Hypnosis with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 37 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
1996]
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III. CAUSES OF PATIENT AWARENESS
"Awareness" in an operation occurs due to the delivery of inadequate
concentrations of anesthetic agents for the needs of the individual pa-
tient.3 4 This may occur because of a faulty anesthetic technique, failure
to check the anesthesia equipment, genuine equipment failure, or when
the anesthetic is intentionally kept to a low level for a justified medical
reason.
35
A. Faulty Anesthetic Technique
The most common cause of "awareness" with recall is faulty anesthetic
procedure.36 Two frequent conditions associated with "awareness" in this
category are: the use of short-acting intravenous agents which may wear
off and result in a period of lucidity before the longer lasting volatile
agents have an opportunity to take effect;37 and, insufficient administra-
tion of the volatile agents. 38 The latter occurs because either the anes-
thetic agent is too weak, or the agent is only used intermittently during
the operation.39 "Awareness" may also occur if the signs of light anesthe-
sia are misinterpreted because the EKG monitors4" or blood pressure de-
vices are not checked regularly, or when an inaccurate oxygen monitor or
pulse oximeter causes the anesthesiologist to increase inappropriately the
concentration of oxygen, thereby diluting the anesthetic gases.4"
Faulty anesthetic technique may also cause "awareness" when the an-
esthesiologist fails to consider the particular needs of a patient who may
be more resistant to the effects of anesthetics than others.42 Studies have
HYPNOSIS 192, 194 (1989) (describing a PTSD patient who suffered through "awareness"
during surgery).
34. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 390.
35. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 390-95; R.L. Hargrove, Awareness: A Medicolegal
Problem, in CONSCIOUSNESS, AWARENESS AND PAIN IN GENERAL ANESTHESIA, supra note
20, at 149, 150-52.
36. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 391. Up to 70% of awareness cases have been esti-
mated to be the result of poor anesthetic technique. Hargrove, supra note 35, at 150.
37. Frank Guerra, Awareness and Recall, 24 INT'L ANESTHESIOLOGY CLINICS, 75, 88
(1986); Hargrove, supra note 35, at 150.
38. Guerra, supra note 37, at 88.
39. Hargrove, supra note 35, at 150-52.
40. An EKG, also known as an electrocardiogram, is defined as a "graphic tracing of
the variations in electrical potential caused by the excitation of the heart muscle and de-
tected at the body surface." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 534 (28th
ed. 1994).
41. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 394.
42. See Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 283.
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shown that patients who suffer from alcoholism or drug addiction, or
have prior exposure to anesthetic agents, require greater anesthetic doses
to enable them to lose consciousness. 4 3
B. Failure to Check the Anesthesia Equipment
Failure to check the anesthesia apparatus is the second leading cause of
patient awareness. 44 If, for instance, the anesthetic gases are diluted with
air or oxygen because of a loose connection, the patient may be venti-
lated with room air, preventing unconsciousness.4 5 Additionally, if the
vaporizer 46 is not connected or refilled properly, or if an unobserved dis-
connection or emptying of the intravenous agent occurs, patient "aware-
ness" may again result. 7 Because a disconnection in the anesthesia
equipment may occur during the administration of the anesthesia itself,
great care must be employed throughout the operation.4 8
C. Genuine Equipment Failure
Patient "awareness" can also result from failure of the anesthetic appa-
ratus itself for a reason unattributable to the anesthesiologist 9.4  Appara-
tus failures include: (1) vaporizers which deliver anesthetic
concentrations well below the level indicated by the dial setting;50 (2)
faulty ventilators which supply an inadequate amount of anesthetic; 51 and
(3) perforated hoses which inadequately connect the supply of anesthetic
gases to the vaporizer.52 As a result of these occurrences, the anesthetic
gas flow to the patient is reduced, thereby making it more likely that the
patient will experience "awareness., 53
While the anesthesiologist cannot readily be faulted for not detecting
this type of equipment failure prior to the administration of the anes-
43. Id.; Guerra, supra note 37, at 89.
44. Hargrove, supra note 35, at 150-52. TWenty percent of all patient "awareness"
cases can be attributed to the anesthesiologist's failure to check his anesthetic apparatus.
Id.
45. Id.
46. A vaporizer is defined as a device for converting a drug into an aerosol so that the
medication can be taken by inhalation. AMA ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1038 (Charles
B. Clayman ed., 1988).
47. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 394.
48. See id
49. See id. at 395.
50. Hargrove, supra note 35, at 150-52.
51. Id.
52. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 394.
53. See id.
1996]
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thetic, one can argue that the anesthesiologist should have been able to
recognize the symptoms of light anesthesia once the operation was
underway.54
D. Justified Risks
At times, providing the patient with a low level of anesthesia may be
justified fully by medical necessity.55 When a person is desperately ill or
in a life threatening situation, it is not unreasonable to keep the patient
lightly anesthetized. 56 The reason for under-anesthetizing is that if the
patient's already weak vital signs are suppressed further, it is possible the
patient may die or become unable to regain consciousness once the anes-
thetic agents are removed.57 Light anesthesia is generally justified when
patients undergo cardiopulmonary bypasses,58 pediatric operations,59 and
Caesarian sections.6°
In Caesarian sections, if the level of anesthesia the mother receives is
too high, the infant could be harmed because the anesthetic may depress
the fetus and lead to respiratory problems after birth.6' Therefore, it is
preferable to administer light anesthesia until such time as the baby's um-
bilical cord is clamped; then complete anesthesia can be safely
administered. 62
E. The Problem of Detection
Currently, there are numerous methods to detect "awareness. ,63
Although none are completely reliable, recently some progress has been
made.' "Awareness" is difficult to detect because there is no direct way
54. Hargrove, supra note 35, at 150.
55. Id. at 152; Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 394.
56. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 394.
57. Id.
58. Desiderio, supra note 25, at 186.
59. Id.
60. Brad Lee Hilaman, M.D., Anesthesia During Pregnancy, Labor and Delivery, in
LEoAL ISSUES IN ANESTHESIA PRAcricE, supra note 7, at 152, 187.
61. Guerra, supra note 37, at 83; Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 283; Dierdorf,
supra note 4, at 372.
62. Hilaman, supra note 60, at 187.
63. Desiderio, supra note 25, at 186-87.
64. Id. at 186. Today, four devices are being tested to detect unconsciousness and pain
during surgery. Stevens, supra note 4, at E4. The first, called the 40-hertz auditory steady
state response, is similar to an EEG machine (electroencephalogram) in that it detects
brain waves to determine if the patient is conscious. Id. When the brain stops reacting to
the signal, the patient is likely to be unconscious. Id.
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to monitor levels of consciousness.65 Therefore, anesthesiologists must
use other indirect monitoring techniques to help them infer the patient's
level of consciousness. The devices currently in use include blood pres-
sure, heart rate, sweating, and lacrimation (tear) monitors.66 While these
monitors should indicate a change if the patient becomes distressed or
feels pain,67 case studies reveal that the patient may be fully aware and in
pain with no change in any of these mechanisms. 68 Therefore, until it is
possible to test for consciousness, the only true effective method of reduc-
ing incidents of "awareness" is through improved standards of care by
anesthesiologists, rather than dependence on instruments.69
IV. THE ANESTHESIOLOGIST'S DUTY OF CARE
In the United States and Canada, there are currently five organizations
founded by anesthesia professionals for the promotion of safe anesthesia
practice.70 Through publication of journals, annual meetings, and the is-
suance of certifications, these organizations strive to maintain the highest
levels of care possible for patients.71 The American Board of Anesthesi-
The second device, called "the face machine," tracks the contraction of four face muscles
to determine if the patient is feeling any pain. Id. With this instrument, any grimace the
patient makes, no matter how small, may be detected. This provides a method by which
the anesthesiologist can know the patient is close to consciousness. Id. As the facial con-
tractions increase, the greater the chance the patient is conscious. Id.
The third device being tested is the "bispectral EEG." Id. This device uses declassified
naval sonar technology to detect any physiological responses a patient may have to the
incision during surgery. Id.
The last approach being tested, called the mid-latency auditory evoked potential
(MLAEP), measures the brain's reaction to sound. Id. Any brain reaction would indicate
the patient may not be fully unconscious.
See also Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 285; Dierdorf, supra note 4, at 375-77 (dis-
cussing recent progress in this area).
65. Henry L. Bennett, Treating Psychological Sequelae of Awareness, AM. Soc'y AN-
ESTHESIOLOGI5TS NEWSL., Oct. 1994, at 12, 12.
66. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 397.
67. Id.
68. Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 284. It has been suggested that when patients
are treated with muscle relaxants, opioids, and other agents, the patient's sympathetic ner-
vous system may not react thereby preventing the anesthesiologist from being alerted to
the patient's consciousness. Id.
69. Aitkenhead, supra note 26, at 397.
70. William H.L. Dornette, The Standard of Care, in LEGAL ISSUES IN ANESTHESIA
PRACtiCE, supra note 7, at 24, 25. These organizations include the American Association
of Nurse Anesthetists ("AANA"), the American Board of Anesthesiology ("ABA"), the
American Society of Anesthesiologists ("ASA"), the Canadian Anesthetists Society, and
the International Anesthesia Research Society. Id.
71. Id.
1996]
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ologists has established the following guidelines for developing patient
care.
A. Preoperative Duties
Before surgery is attempted, the anesthesiologist has a duty to fully
evaluate each patient to anticipate complications.72 The anesthesiologist
must be familiar with the factors that can lead to "awareness" (such as
alcoholism and narcotics use), and with the type of operations that are
commonly associated with "awareness" (such as cardiopulmonary bypass
procedures or Caesarean sections). 73 The anesthesiologist should also re-
view the patient's past medical history and order any tests74 necessary to
determine what anesthetic to employ, and what dosage to administer.75
In addition, the anesthesiologist should seek the advice of other medical
specialists when there is any doubt as to the preferred treatment. 76 Fail-
ure to abide by these requirements may expose the anesthesiologist to
litigation.77
B. Intraoperative Duties
Before the patient is anesthetized, the anesthesiologist must carefully
and thoroughly prepare and check the equipment, drugs, fluids, and gas
supplies to ensure that all parts of the anesthesia equipment are con-
nected and operating properly.78 In addition, the anesthesiologist must
72. Todaro, supra note 6, at 32. The anesthesiologist's initial meeting with the patient
should accomplish several goals. These goals include: (1) securing pertinent information
about the patient's medical and social history; (2) giving the patient a physical examina-
tion; (3) allowing the patient an opportunity to ask any questions about the anesthetic
procedure (to reduce the patient's anxiety); and, (4) providing the anesthesiologist an op-
portunity to obtain the patient's informed consent. Clement J. Markarian, Preanesthesia
Evaluation, in LEGAL ISSUES IN ANESTHESIA PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 70, 71.
73. Guerra, supra note 37, at 94-95.
74. The most common tests which the anesthesiologist should review to determine the
best anesthetic include: hemoglobin level, hematocrit, blood chemistries, liver function
tests, coagulation studies, and urinalysis. An electrocardiogram and chest film are included
for those patients over 40. Elderly patients may have pulmonary tests to determine if they
suffer from respiratory problems. Markarian, supra note 72, at 72-73.
75. Todaro, supra note 6, at 32, 34.
76. Id. Most anesthesiologists would agree that appropriate consultations are neces-
sary if, in the anesthesiologist's opinion, there is any possibility the patient will benefit
from such expertise. See Markarian, supra note 72, at 73-74.
77. William H.L. Dornette, The Health Care Provider-Patient Relationship, in LEGAL
ISSUES IN ANESTHESIA PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 9, 14.
78. Todaro, supra note 6, at 32, 34.
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have the ability and knowledge to use the anesthesia equipment. 79 Dur-
ing the surgery, the anesthesiologist must continually chart the patient's
status by identifying the various drugs and anesthetic agents that are be-
ing utilized along with the time, amount, -and frequency of dosage. 0
Recently, the increased automation and recording capacity of anes-
thetic devices have allowed anesthesiologists to serve several patients si-
multaneously, while monitoring each patient more carefully.81 The
drawback of increased reliance on these machines is that if such a
machine becomes unavailable because of a malfunction or routine serv-
icing, a serious'decrease in the standard of care may result.82 Patients
might be endangered if hospital personnel become so accustomed to us-
ing these devices that their absence would interfere with the anesthesiolo-
gist's ability to deliver a safe anesthetic.83
Without doubt, the anesthesiologist's'most important duty is to contin-
uously monitor each patient's vital signs, circulation, and ventilation.8 4
Careful monitoring is essential to enable the anesthesiologist to cease-
lessly assess the patient's status and detect early signs of complications,
such as light anesthesia. Only through careful observation can the anes-
thesiologist be in a position to take immediate action to rectify any
problems and reduce the possibility of patient awareness.8 5 When recog-
nition of the complication is delayed because the anesthesiologist fails to
monitor the patient properly, grounds for legal action exist.8 6
C. Postoperative Duties
Upon completion of the operation, the anesthesiologist has the duty to
bring the patient back to consciousness.8 7 This entails remaining with the
79. Id. The guidelines require that the anesthesiologist possess a working knowledge
and capacity to properly apply equipment such as: the laryngoscope, the endotracheal cath-
eters, the selection of airways and masks, the different means of administering artificial
ventilation, the defibrillator, and suctioning equipment. Id.
80. Bartimus & Dymer, supra note 6, at 42.
81. William H. L. Domette, Monitoring the Anesthetized Patient, in LEGAL ISSUES IN
ANESTHESIA PRAcrnCE, supra note 7, at 125, 127. Automated anesthesia machines have
allowed anesthesiologists to record their patient's vital signs more regularly and frequently
than has been possible before. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Todaro, supra note 6, at 34.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 32-36 (describing when claims against the anesthesiologist will become
actionable).
87. The ABA guidelines require the availability of adequate nursing personnel and
19961
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patient as long as necessary to evaluate whether the patient has success-
fully emerged from the anesthetized state."8 Continued monitoring is es-
sential until the patient's condition stabilizes.8 9 Only then is the patient
fit to be released to the recovery room.90
V. THE PATIENT'S POSSIBLE THEORIES OF RECOVERY
In 1994, roughly seven percent of all suits against anesthesiologists re-
lated to patient awareness. 9 ' This statistic reveals that "awareness" dur-
ing surgery is not an unusual and remote occurrence. Because
anesthesiologists have a duty to remain informed about the risks related
to their practice, 2 failure to take the proper precautions to prevent
"awareness" may render them legally liable. 93
Depending on the circumstances of the case, a patient suing the anes-
thesiologist because of consciousness during an operation is likely to rely
on one of the following theories of liability: medical malpractice, breach
of contract, or failure to obtain informed consent.94 The patient is most
likely to pursue a claim of medical malpractice because the anesthesiolo-
gist's insurance will provide coverage if he is found negligent.95 The
plaintiff may also bring a products liability suit against the manufacturer
equipment to safely care for the recovering patient. They also call for the individual re-
sponsible for administering the anesthesia to remain with the patient so long as his pres-
ence is necessary. Id. at 34-35 (citing ABA Guidelines for Developing Patient Care on
Anesthesiology).
88. Id. at 35.
89. William H. L. Dornette, Postanesthesia Care, in LEGAL ISSUES IN ANESTHESIA
PRACriCE, supra note 7, at 145, 146. The anesthesiologist must afford the patient recover-
ing from the effects of the anesthetic adequate monitoring and respiratory and vascular
support until the patient has stabilized and his recovery is fairly complete. Id. The pa-
tient's recovery level is determined by comparing the patient's pre-anesthetic statistics with
the patient's current status. This process involves comparing the patient's respiration, cir-
culation, consciousness, and color before and after the surgery, as well as the ability to
cough freely. Todaro, supra note 6, at 35.
90. Todaro, supra note 6, at 35; see also Bartimus & Dymer, supra note 6, at 43-44
(describing the ASA guidelines for post anesthesia care); Dornette, supra note 89, at 145-
51 (describing post anesthesia care requirements).
91. Peter S. Sebel, Are Our Patients Listening?, 58 AM. Soc'y ANESTHESIOLOGISTS
NEWSL., Oct. 1994, at 7.
92. Dornette, supra note 70, at 26.
93. Id. at 14, 25-27 (stating that practitioners must continuously remain informed of
the availability of new drugs, enhanced safety, and fewer side effects); Todaro, supra note
6, at 32.
94. B.H. Thompson, An American Legal View, in CONSCIOUSNESS, AWARENESS AND
PAIN IN GENERAL ANESTHESIA, supra note 20, at 165, 166-69.
95. Dornette, supra note 77, at 15. The author also explains that most medical suits
fall under malpractice rather than breach of contract because of the nature of the services
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of the anesthesia equipment if an equipment failure is found to be the
cause of the awareness. 96
A. Medical Malpractice
In order to succeed in a medical malpractice suit based on "aware-
ness," the plaintiff must establish two crucial facts. First, the plaintiff
must prove that he was actually conscious during the operation.97 Sec-
ond, he must prove that he was rendered conscious as a result of the
anesthesiologist's negligence. 98 Proving that the patient was conscious is
relatively easy if the patient recollects specific conversations from the op-
eration, the manner in which the operation was performed, or specific
problems during the surgery which the patient could not have known
about other than by being "aware" during the surgery.99 When this type
of corroboration is not available, however, the fact finder may find the
patient's claim too speculative to warrant relief.100 For example, in
Aubert v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana,'0 1 the court rejected the plain-
tiffs suit based on his wife's pain and suffering during general anesthesia
because there was no direct evidence that she was conscious or in pain
during the operation. 0 2
In addition, for the plaintiff to succeed in his suit, he cannot merely be
unhappy with the result of the surgery.'0 3 Rather, the patient must prove
provided, the absence of any intent to do wrong, and the absence of assertions that a given
result will be forthcoming. Id.
96. Todaro, supra note 6, at 37-38.
97. Thompson, supra note 94, at 166.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 363 So. 2d 1223 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
102. Id. at 1231. In Aubert, the widower of a Woman who died following childbirth by
caesarean section brought a medical malpractice suit against the anesthesiologist and hos-
pital. Id. at 1227. The defendants were found liable for negligence based on the finding
that the anesthesiologists inserted the endotracheal tube (to supply oxygen to the patient's
lungs) into the woman's esophagus, rather than her trachea, and then failing to discover
the mistake in a timely manner. Id. at 1227. This led to hypoxia (deprivation of oxygen to
the brain) causing irreversible brain damages and death. Id. The plaintiff also contended
that the defendants were liable for his wife's pain and suffering based on the inference that
after the initial anesthesia wore off, the continuing anesthesia did not take effect because
the tube was improperly placed. Id. Of course, the patient could not communicate that
she was in pain because of the muscle relaxants she was given. Id. The court rejected the
plaintiff's claim, stating that the trial court judge was not clearly erroneous in his conclu-
sion that the evidence that Mrs. Aubert might have been conscious during the operation
was too speculative. Id.
103. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 26.
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the anesthesiologist was actually
negligent in performing his duty, and that this negligence caused, the
"awareness" which in turn led to the injury."°4 Therefore, the anesthesi-
ologist will only be held responsible for not anticipating known complica-
tions or for failing to take reasonable precautions which are necessary to
avoid injuring the patient. 10 5
To establish negligence, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the anesthesi-
ologist owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the anesthesiologist deviated
from the standard of care; (3) the plaintiff's injury was proximately
caused by the deviation; and, (4) damages resulted from the breach. 10 6
1. Duty
Generally, all jurisdictions consider the practice of anesthesiology a
specialty and hold the anesthesiologist to the standard of care expected of
that specialty.'0 7 The actual level of care which the anesthesiologist is
expected to provide, however, may not be consistent among all jurisdic-
tions.108 The attorney therefore, must determine which standard the trial
court will use. 109 The trial court may apply the "strict locality rule" re-
quiring that the physician be held to the degree of diligence, learning, and
skill possessed by other physicians in his or her particular community." 0
This standard provides patients with the least protection because even
though the procedures used may adhere to local standards, they may
prove to be outdated."' Alternatively, the trial, court may apply the
"modified locality rule" which requires that the physician be held to the
degree of diligence, learning, and skill possessed by physicians in the
same or similar community." 2 A third standard the trial court may apply
104. Id. at 34.
105. Id.
106. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 99, 326 (1981); 61A
AM. JUR. 2D § 99 (1981); Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp., 652 P.2d 260, 263 (Okla. 1982).
107. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 30. A similar duty of care is also expected of
Certified Nurse Anesthetists. Id. at '31. For further discussion of duty, see Bartimus &
Dymer, supra note 6, at 40; Dornette, supra note 70, at 25-27.
108. Dornette, supra note 70, at 25-26.
109. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 30.
110. See, e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 218 (1981).
111. See id.
112. See, e.g., id.; Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 30.
The general standard of care required of a doctor is that he possess the reason-
able degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by members of the profes-
sion and of his particular school of medicine in the community where he practices,
or in similar communities, and that he will use such learning and skill in treating
his patient with ordinary skill and diligence.
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is the "national standard rule" which requires that the physician be held
to that degree of diligence, learning, and skill possessed by physicians
nationally.113 This option is by far the most common 14 and provides pa-
tients with the best protection by requiring that practitioners stay in-
formed of improvements and developments in their particular practice
area which occur nationally."
15
In most jurisdictions, proving the standard of care is particularly diffi-
cult because it is not sufficient to establish that some or even a majority of
anesthesiologists would have provided different treatment."16 As long as
the defendant chose and administered the anesthetics in a manner accept-
able to a respected segment of anesthesiologists, the defendant will
prevail."
17
As a general rule, the best means for the plaintiff to establish the anes-
thesiologist's breach of the standard of care is through expert testi-
mony. 1 8 A witness will qualify as an expert if his education, training, and
experience demonstrate that he is qualified to render an opinion on the
subject of the testimony. 119 Once the expert is deemed qualified, he will
be able to testify on the applicable standard of care, and whether any
deviation from this standard occurred during the surgery. 2 ° Therefore,
the expert can inform the trier of fact whether the anesthesiologist fol-
Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 826 (Kan. 1989).
113. See, e.g., 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 219 (1981).
114. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 30.
115. Dornette, supra note 70, at 25. Considering the ease with which one can acquire
information through communication and publications, the furnishing of national board ex-
aminations, and publication of national standards, the standard of care has slowly ex-
panded to encompass all practitioners of that particular specialty nationwide. Id.
116. See, e.g., Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964, 965 (Pa. 1992).
A medical practitioner has an absolute defense to a claim of negligence when it is
determined that the prescribed treatment or procedure has been approved by one
group of medical experts even though an alternate school of thought recommends
another approach, or it is agreed among experts that alternative treatments and
practices are acceptable.
Id. "Where competent medical authority is divided, a physician will not be held responsible
if, in the exercise of his judgment, he followed a course of treatment advocated by a consid-
erable number of recognized and respected professionals in his given area of expertise."
Id at 969.
117. See id.
118. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 32. "[T]he expert witness is the sole means of
proving whether a defendant complied with the applicable standard of care in the treat-
ment of a patient or execution of a procedure." Id.
119. See id.
120. Id. (citing 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, § 352 (1981)).
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lowed proper procedures, or whether he deviated from them12' by failing
to check the anesthetic monitors or the proper operation and connection
of the anesthetic machines.
Another useful tool a lawyer can use to determine the standard of care
is through researching published standards. These can be found in hospi-
tal guidelines, regulatory agency mandates, and professional organization
guidelines sponsored by the American Society of Anesthesiologists, or
the American Board of Anesthesiology. 22
2. Breach
The anesthesiologist's deviation from the established standard of care
is a critical element of the claim which is generally proven by expert testi-
mony. 123 The attorney must establish "what actions constitute the stan-
dard of medical care in a given situation, then introduce sufficient factual
evidence to show that the physician's actions did not measure up to that
standard.' 24 The plaintiff's strongest proof is an unequivocal statement
by a qualified and respected expert that the anesthesiologist's conduct did
not meet the required standard of care.' 25 The expert must support his
contentions by using medical and hospital records which demonstrate
how the defendant's improper administration of the anesthesia, failure to
react to a warning sign, or failure to check the proper functioning of the
machines, led to the patient's "awareness."1 26
3. Causation
a. Direct evidence
The next factor in establishing a prima facie case of medical malprac-
tice is causation.' 27 To prove causation two factors must be established.
First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct gave rise to the
injury (causation in fact).' 28 Second, the plaintiff must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant's conduct was a substan-
tial factor in bringing about the injury (proximate cause). 2 9 Only in
121. See discussion infra Part V(A)(2).
122. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 18-19.
123. Id. at 33.
124. Id. (citing Orozco v. Henry Ford Hosp., 290 N.W.2d 363 (Mich. 1980)).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 33-34.
127. Id. at 34.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see, e.g., Aubert v. Charity Hosp., 363 So.2d 1223 (La.Ct.App. 1978). "A plain-
tiff has successfully borne the burden of proof when the evidence taken as a whole indi-
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those cases in which the anesthesiologist's deviation from the standard of
care is a substantial factor in making the plaintiff aware during the opera-
tion would the claim be actionable. Where there are a number of possi-
ble causes for the plaintiff's injury, the anesthesiologist's negligence will
be regarded as the proximate cause only if the "evidence shows that the
defendant's negligence was more likely the causative factor [of plaintiff's
'awareness'] than other possible causes. ' 130
Causation, like duty and breach, is best established by an expert wit-
ness who testifies that had the defendant followed proper procedures, the
plaintiff's damages would have been avoided. 3 It should be noted, how-
ever, that for plaintiff's claim to be actionable, he must also prove that
there was no intervening cause which would insulate the anesthesiologist
from liability. 132 Thus, the anesthesiologist would not be liable if a mal-
function of an anesthetic instrument occurred without the anesthesiolo-
gist's knowledge or fault, or if some other problem occurred which could
not be reasonably predicted.'
33
b. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Ordinarily, the anesthesiologist's negligence is proven directly through
the use of expert testimony. Occasionally, however, the plaintiff may be
able to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to create a presumption of the
defendant's negligence without having to directly prove that the defend-
ant breached his duty of care. 3 If the doctrine is satisfied, the burden
will then shift to the defendant to produce evidence that he was not negli-
gent, or that his conduct was not the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 131
To use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must prove the
following three conditions: 36 the type of injury the plaintiff suffered does
cates the defendant's negligence was the most plausible or likely cause of the occurrence
and no other factor can as reasonably be ascribed as the cause." Id. at 1230.
130. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 35 (citing Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d 341
(4th Cir. 1982)).
131. See id. at 32.
132. Thompson v. Presbyterian Hosp. Inc., 652 P.2d at 264. The court stated the anes-
thesiologist will be insulated from liability if the supervening cause was: "(1) independent
from the original act, (2) adequate of itself to bring about the result and (3) one whose
occurrence was not reasonably foreseeable." Id.
133. See id.
134. Jeffrey W. Puryear, Schmidt v. Gibbs: The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to
Arkansas Medical Malpractice Litigation, 46 ARK. L. REV. 397, 403 (1993).
135. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 40.
136. See Morgan v. Children's Hosp., 480 N.E.2d 464, 466 (Ohio 1985); Randy R.
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not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; 137 the injury was caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the de-
fendant;138 and, the plaintiffs injury was not due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.' 39 Thus, the plaintiff must
show: (1) that a patient will not ordinarily be conscious during general
anesthesia unless the anesthesiologist is negligent; (2) no one else was in
charge of administering the anesthesia; and, (3) that because the muscle
relaxants rendered the patient paralyzed, the injury could not have been
due to the patient's fault. After the patient establishes these three facts,
the burden will shift to the anesthesiologist to prove that he was not in
fact negligent.
140
Although most jurisdictions permit the use of res ipsa loquitur in medi-
cal malpractice cases, 141 some jurisdictions require the first element to be
established through expert testimony. 42 This requirement is based on
the premise that the patient's injury may not necessarily speak for itself
because of the complex nature of the operation.143 Therefore, an expert
may be needed to characterize the patient's awareness as a condition that
Koenders, Medical Malpractice: Res Ipsa Loquitur in Negligent Anesthesia Cases, 49 A.L.R.
4TH 63, 72 (1986).
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Koenders, supra note 136, at 72-74.
141. Id. at 93-94.
142. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 40.
In Orkin v. Holy Cross Hosp., 569 A.2d 207 (Md. 1990), the Maryland Court of Appeals
held that when a defendant's negligence is not obvious due to the medical complexity of
the matter, lay jurors cannot infer the defendant's negligence from the facts alone without
expert testimony. Id. at 209. The court, therefore, claimed that when a resolution of an
issue of negligence requires knowledge of complicated matters (such as human anatomy,
and standards of care), res ipsa loquitur does not apply unless expert testimony is available
to provide the jury with the background to determine whether the defendant was in fact
negligent. Id.
The same principle was held in McKinney v. Nash, 174 Cal. Rptr. 642, 645 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981). In this case, the court held that:
"[slince the res ipsa loquitur instruction permits the jury to infer negligence from
the happening of the [injury] alone, there must be a basis, either in common expe-
rience or expert testimony that when such an [injury] occurs, it is more probable
than not the result of negligence." The record here reveals that the medical pro-
cedures employed by [the anesthesiologists for a hernia repair]... were of suffi-
cient complexity to be outside the realm of [the jury's] common experience and
appreciation.
Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that the question of whether the injury the
plaintiff sustained during surgery was negligent required expert testimony. Id.
143. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 40.
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does not normally occur absent negligence to make the claim actiona-
ble.' Res ipsa loquitur will be applied without expert testimony if the
judge is persuaded that a lay person could easily understand that "aware-
ness" does not ordinarily occur absent negligence.'45 Once the plaintiff
proves the res ipsa loquitur elements, the case will generally go to the jury
to determine whether the circumstantial evidence is strong enough to
prove the anesthesiologist was negligent.' 46
4. Damages
The last requirement necessary for a prima facie case of malpractice is
damages. It is a well settled principle of law that in order to recover
damages from a defendant, the plaintiff must be able to establish a defin-
able lOSS.147 In the case of patient "awareness," the injury will most likely
be the plaintiff's physical pain during the surgery, and any psychological
suffering and trauma that developed subsequent to the operation.' 48
Generally, pain and suffering is not compensable unless consciously ex-
perienced. 149 Proving this point should not be difficult, however, because
the very nature of the plaintiff's claim is that he was "conscious" during
the operation.150 The plaintiff will most likely argue that he should be
compensated for the pain, suffering, fright, and shock felt during the sur-
gery as a result of being conscious.' 51 The patient may also seek compen-
sation for the anxiety, depression, mental suffering, and trauma that
developed after the surgery, as well as harm from loss of sleep, and past
and future impairment of the ability to enjoy life.' 2
Recovery for injuries suffered during anesthesia is generally promising.
In a study conducted by the American Society of Anesthesiologists in
1988, an analysis of suits against anesthesiologists revealed that "the cur-
rent system of payment for anesthesia-related injuries is favorable to the
144. Id.
145. Id. An example of this is when the patient receives an injury to a part of the body
which should not be affected during the operation. Id.
146. Id.
147. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 64 (1966).
148. Aitkenhead, supra note 8, at 351; Moerman, supra note 16, at 461-62; Aitkenhead,
supra note 26, at 389-90; Heneghan, supra note 20, at 2-3.
149. See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 241 (1988).
150. Thompson, supra note 94, at 166. "This should be -easy when, for example, the
plaintiff can give a detailed description of the operation or the doctor's conversation during
the operation." Id.
151. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 52.
152. Id. at 52-53.
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patient when a lawsuit is filed."153 The study further showed that even
when the anesthesiologist's standard of care was deemed appropriate by
other experts, the anesthesiologist still preferred to settle in forty-two
percent of the cases.154 Therefore, as long as the plaintiff can convince
the fact finder that he was injured as a result of the defendant's act, the
patient has a good chance of recovery, even though the anesthesiologist
might not have been technically negligent.155
5. The Anesthesiologist's Possible Defenses
After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of negligence, the de-
fendant can rebut the plaintiff's case by raising certain defenses. First, the
defendant can show, through expert testimony, that the patient's injury
(consciousness and pain during the operation) was not an event that was
reasonably foreseeable based on the defendant's meticulous conduct dur-
ing the administration of the anesthesia. 56 If the defendant can show the
injury was too remote, then proximate cause would be missing, causing
the collapse of the plaintiff's claim.157 Second, if the defendant can prove
that there were no warning signs indicating the patient was aware during
the operation, and that he was extremely careful throughout the opera-
tion, then the plaintiff's case will also be weakened. 15 Third, if warning
signs were present, the defendant can argue that several plausible expla-
nations existed for them, and that the course of action taken was accepta-
ble under current medical practice. 159
In response to such a defense, the plaintiff must demonstrate that there
were sufficient signs indicating the patient was aware. 6 ° Alternatively,
the plaintiff can seek to demonstrate that even if there were no clear
warning signs, the anesthesiologist failed to take the actions necessary to
reduce the likelihood of "awareness"' 161 by meticulously checking the an-
153. Frederick W. Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA
1599, 1602 (1989).
154. Id. at 1603.
155. Id. In a study conducted by JAMA, even if the anesthesiologist's performance was
deemed appropriate by peers, patients were still able to recover in 42% of the cases. Id. at
1602-03.
156. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 43. An example would be if the defendant
could show that the likelihood of patient awareness was so remote, as to not seem likely.
Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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esthetic instruments or following expected procedures. 62
B. Contract Theory
Even if the anesthesiologist was not negligent, the patient may still sue
the anesthesiologist for breach of contract. This theory is an option for
plaintiffs if, prior to the surgery, the anesthesiologist promised the patient
that he would not be conscious during the operation.163 The patient in
turn must then prove that he relied on that promise to his detriment.164
Thus, if the anesthesiologist expressly promised the patient that he would
not feel pain, or be conscious, the defendant will be liable so long as the
patient can also prove that he relied on that assurance to his detriment. 165
It is important to note that jurisdictions may vary with regard to the
requirements necessary to establish a contract or warranty claim. Most
courts will distinguish a promise of a particular result, which is usually
actionable, from a mere generalized statement that the treatment will be
safe, which is usually not actionable.166 Some courts will require clear
proof167 that a warranty was actually made;168 other courts will require
clear and convincing evidence1 69 that the physician did in fact make the
162. Id.
163. Thompson, supra note 94, at 167.
164. Scarzella v. Saxon, 436 A.2d 358, 361 (D.C. 1981).
165. For plaintiff's claim to be actionable, he must produce proof "of an express con-
tract by which the physician clearly promises a particular result and the patient consents to
treatment in reliance on that promise." McKinney v. Nash, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 648; see also
Scarzella v. Saxon, 436 A.2d at 360. In this case, the surgeon told the patient that:
the operation [for urethral diverticulectomy] was a simple operation without com-
plications ... [;that] [i]t only requires a short stay in the hospital, perhaps three or
four days ... [;] that the operation would just temporarily interrupt [her] work
[and] temporarily interfere with her sex relationship with [her] husband... [;and]
that the operation is a safe one.
Id. The jury found for the plaintiff even though Ms. Saxon signed a consent form stating
that there was no guarantee or assurance by anyone as to the result. Id.; see also, Mason v.
Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 975 (Pa. 1982) (The physician assured Mrs. Mason that
the operation "would prevent her from incurring future pregnancies." Three years later
she gave birth by caesarian section; this was actionable under contract and tort law.).
166. McKinney, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
167. See, e.g., Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973); Mood v. Kilgore
425 N.E.2d 341, 342 n.4 (Mass. 1981).
168. Scarzella, 436 A.2d at 362.
169. "Clear and convincing evidence" is a higher standard than "clear proof" but lower
than "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "[T]o establish a fact or an element by clear and
convincing evidence a party must persuade the jury that the proposition is highly probable,
or must produce in the mind of the fact finder a firm belief or conviction that the allega-
tions in question are true." 29 AM. JUR. 2D § 157 (1994).
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warranty.' 70 In addition, some jurisdictions require the patient to pay the
doctor consideration separate from the money paid for the operation it-
self,'7 ' while others will not if the warranty was made prior to the surgery
or treatment. 172 Finally, some jurisdictions permit suits for breach of con-
tract only if the contract was in writing.' 73
Physicians are therefore advised to "be very careful in what they say to
patients before an operation.' 74 Any assertions made, such as "you'll
feel nothing," or "you'll be completely unconscious," may be construed
by a court as an enforceable guarantee.175
C. Informed Consent Claims
A third avenue a patient may take to bring suit against the anesthesiol-
ogist is lack of informed consent, It is widely recognized that absent
emergency circumstances, the physician must obtain the patient's in-
formed consent before administering anesthesia.' 76 As an integral part of
the physician's overall obligation to the patient, the anesthesiologist has a
duty to disclose, within reason, the different options a patient may choose
regarding the proposed therapy, as well as the potential risks inherent in
each choice.' 77 Therefore,
[u]nless a patient is told ahead of time that there is a risk that he
or she will be conscious during the operation, the patient who
ends up listening to the operation or feeling pain may have
cause to sue the anesthesiologist on the ground that he or she
did not give an informed consent to such an unusual
opportunity.178
Thus, it is advisable for the physician to inform the patient of the possibil-
ity that "awareness" may occur, if the anesthesiologist believes the pa-
170. Scarzella, 436 A.2d at 362. Some courts have interpreted clear proof to mean clear
and convincing evidence. See, e.g., In re Manuel L., 865 P.2d 718, 720-21 (Cal. 1994).
171. Scarzella, 436 A.2d at 362.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-562(c) (West 1992).
174. Thompson, supra note 94, at 167-68.
175. Id. at 168.
176. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 15.
177. Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514 (Cal. 1972). In order to obtain a true
informed consent, the anesthesiologist must disclose the available facts and his opinion as
to risks and benefits based on those facts. When there is any doubt whether disclosure
should be made, the anesthesiologist should lean toward over-disclosure, rather than with-
holding information. Markarian, supra note 72, at 75.
178. Thompson, supra note 94, at 168.
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tient may experience periods of consciousness during the operation.' 79
The main issue in a suit for lack of informed consent generally will be
whether the anesthesiologist had a duty to notify the patient of the risk of
possible consciousness. 180 The analysis of this question will vary from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction.
In most states, the anesthesiologist's duty to inform the patient of the
risks and dangers of the proposed surgical procedure will depend on
whether the anesthesiologist acted as a reasonable medical practitioner
under the same or similar circumstances. 181 Therefore, most courts will
look at the custom of physicians practicing in the community to see if the
physician acted reasonably by not disclosing the fact that the patient may
be conscious during portions of the operation. 182 The reasonableness of
the disclosure, or nondisclosure, will depend on the facts and circum-
stances of each case.' 83 The burden of proof will generally rest with the
plaintiff to establish that the anesthesiologist deviated from his duty by
not disclosing sufficient information upon which the patient could make
an informed consent."8 In those jurisdictions which utilize the reason-
able physician standard, expert testimony must affirm the assertion that
the anesthesiologist deviated from the required duty to disclose. 85
In other states, 86 the focus of the court is on whether the risk of being
conscious is something an average, reasonable patient would have consid-
ered material in his or her decision to undergo surgery.18 7 Thus, these
jurisdictions shift the focus of inquiry from the reasonable physician stan-
dard to the reasonable patient standard. The issue to be resolved will
entail whether a reasonable patient would have considered such informa-
tion, or warning, "material" in making his or her decision. "[A] risk is
thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or
should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach signifi-
cance to the risk ... in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 830 (Kan. 1989).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 16.
186. Truman v. Thomas, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 311 (1980).
187. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (Cal. 1972); Jones v. Griffith, 688 F. Supp.
446, 447 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Coryell v. Smith, 653 N.E. 2d 1317, 1320 (Il. App. Ct. 1995);
Hondroulis v. Schumacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 403 (La. 1988).
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therapy.'1
88
In jurisdictions that apply the reasonable patient standard, the plaintiff
has the initial burden of going forward with evidence to establish a prima
facie case.' 89 Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts
to the physician to support his decision to not disclose.' 90 These jurisdic-
tions do not require expert medical testimony to establish the informed
consent claim because the physician's duty is determined from the pa-
tient's needs and point of view.' 9 '
A physician can interpose several defenses for his decision not to in-
form the patient of the risk of awareness. The strongest defense an anes-
thesiologist can use is the "therapeutic privilege" defense.' 92 This
privilege releases the anesthesiologist from liability for failing to tell the
patient about the risk of consciousness "if the patient's emotional state
was fragile enough that telling the patient ran the risk of making the op-
eration more dangerous or leading the patient irrationally to reject the
safest anesthetic technique."'193
A second defense exists when emergency circumstances dictate that the
patient must undergo immediate surgery without time to obtain con-
sent. 94 Thus, if "the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of
consenting, and harm from a failure to treat is imminent and outweighs
any harm threatened by the proposed treatment," then the physician will
not necessarily be faulted for failing to disclose to the patient that he may
be conscious during the operation. 195
In determining whether the patient should have been warned of the
risk of being conscious, the courts weigh two factors: the statistical
188. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
189. Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 516; Truman v. Thomas, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 312. To
establish a prima facie case a plaintiff will have to show: (1) the anesthesiologist had a duty
to inform him of the risk of awareness because a reasonable patient would find it material
in making a decision; (2) failure to disclose the risk led the patient to undergo the surgery;
(3) but for the anesthesiologist's failure to disclose, the patient would not have undergone
the surgery; and (4) during the surgery, the patient was fully aware and experienced excru-
ciating pain. Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 515-16.
190. Id.
191. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 16. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 792; Cobbs, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 514; Small v. Gifford Memorial Hosp., 349 A.2d 703, 706 (Vt. 1975) (discussing
whether a reasonable person would want to know).
192. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 789. In this exception, the physician calculates
that the risk of disclosure would pose such a threat of detriment to the patient as to be
deemed permissible. Id.
193. Thompson, supra note 94, at 169.
194. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d at 788.
195. Id.
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probability that "awareness" will occur, and the court's perception of how
traumatic it is to be rendered conscious during surgery. 196 It is not ex-
pected that physicians disclose every minute risk. Therefore, courts will
generally not require disclosure if the chance of "awareness" was minus-
cule. 9 7 However, "awareness" during surgery is estimated to occur in .2
to 1%198 of all general anesthesia surgeries. Because this translates into
thirty thousand cases annually in the United States alone, this risk is sig-
nificant and should be disclosed. 199 In addition, even if the court believes
the risk is too minimal to require disclosure, the fact that consciousness
may lead to severe trauma and dysfunction may still lead the court to
agree that disclosure should have been provided.2 °°
Once the plaintiff convinces the court that he should have been in-
formed of the risk, his case is still not won. To prevail, the plaintiff must
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that had the anesthesiolo-
gist actually informed him about the risk of awareness and pain, he would
have refused the procedure or insisted on a different anesthetic tech-
nique.20 1 This requirement is seen in Cobbs v. Grant,202 where the court
ruled against the plaintiff's lack of informed consent claim because he
failed to establish that were he informed of the risk entailed in treating
his ulcer, he would not have consented to the operation.2 °3 The plaintiff
may find it especially difficult to prevail if the anesthesiologist can prove
the anesthetic technique used was the least risky and most suitable for the
patient's needs.
20 4
D. Medical Products Liability
Even if the anesthesiologist was not negligent and properly informed
the plaintiff of the possibility of "awareness" during the operation, the
patient may still be able to recover damages in a products liability suit.20 5
A products liability suit is actionable when the anesthetic apparatus itself
196. Thompson, supra note 94, at 169.
197. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 786.
198. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See also Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3,
at 282 (discussing additional studies with estimates of awareness occurring in up to four
percent of all patients undergoing general anesthesia).
199. Id.
200. Thompson, supra note 94, at 169.
201. Id.
202. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
203. Id. at 11 (citing Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74 (1965)); Sharpe v. Pugh, 155
S.E.2d 108 (N.C. 1965).
204. Thompson, supra note 94, at 169.
205. See Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 37-38.
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fails to deliver an adequate dosage of anesthetic agents, or an alarm to
alert the anesthesiologist of a disconnection fails to work.206 Addition-
ally, a products liability suit will be possible if the anesthetic agent used
during the surgery contained impurities or was mislabeled, thereby lead-
ing to the patient's injury.207
In contrast to the other suits discussed in this Comment, a products
liability suit does not target the anesthesiologist for failing to abide by the
applicable standard of care. Rather, the suit targets the manufacturer of
the anesthetic device which malfunctioned, or the drug which was misla-
beled or adulterated.2 8 A plaintiff may find a products liability suit espe-
cially attractive if the manufacturer has deep pockets2 9 with which to
satisfy the potential adverse judgment against it.
The legal theories under which a products liability claim can be brought
include strict liability,2 10 negligence,211 breach of warranty,212 and mis-
branding. 213  The manufacturer will be held liable if the plaintiff can
prove that: (1) the machine was defective, and did not supply sufficient
206. See discussion supra Part III(C).
207. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 39.
208. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation: Public Liability Medical Machinery Used in
Plaintiffs Treatment 34 A.L.R. 4TH 533, 533 (1984); Bryan J. Maedgen et al., A Survey of
Law Regarding the Liability of Manufacturers and Sellers of Drug Products and Medical
Devices, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395, 397-457 (1986).
209. The term "deep pockets" is defined as "a person or corporation of substantial
wealth and resources from which a claim or judgment may be made." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 414 (6th ed. 1990).
210. In Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915 (Kan. 1990), the Supreme Court of
Kansas explained that:
The public policy considerations underlying the doctrine of strict liability are that
the manufacturer can anticipate and guard against the recurrence of hazards, that
the cost of injury, which may be overwhelming to an injured individual, can be
distributed by the manufacturer among the consuming public, and that the mar-
keting of defective products should be discouraged.
Id. at 923 (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988)).
211. Landis, supra note 208, at 533; Maedgen, supra note 208, at 402, 415.
In a negligence action, the issue is whether a defendant exercised due care in
formulating the warning [of the dangers associated with its product]. The manu-
facturer's duty to test and investigate its product depends on the foreseeability of
the hazards to potential users in light of current scientific medical knowledge.
Strict liability suits, on the other hand, confront whether the lack of warning
made the product unreasonably dangerous.
Id. at 402, 415.
212. In most jurisdictions, the seller is required to warn foreseeable users against the
presence of dangers in his or her product if the dangers are not generally known.
Maedgen, supra note 208, at 455. For a breach of express warranty to exist, the defendant
must represent that its product is not harmful and entails no risk. Id. at 416.
213. Id. at 452.
Patient Awareness During General Anesthesia
anesthesia; (2) the defendant was the manufacturer or seller of the prod-
uct alleged to have caused the injury; (3) the defect was present when the
product left the manufacturer's factory; and, (4) the plaintiff's injury was
proximately caused by the product.214 In addition, the manufacturer may
be held liable if it failed to furnish appropriate warnings detailing the
possibility that the anesthetic machine may malfunction, or that insuffi-
cient levels of anesthesia may be released without notice.21 5
An example of such a suit is Ohio Medical Products v. Suber, Inc.2 16 In
Suber, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in excess of six
million dollars against the manufacturers, sellers, and servicers of an an-
esthetic gas machine, for causing plaintiff's wife to suffer permanent brain
damage from an overdose of anesthesia during a minor surgical proce-
dure.2 17 The plaintiffs, using three expert witnesses, presented extensive
testimony showing that the machine was negligently and defectively
designed, that the defendants negligently failed to warn of the hazards
associated with the use of the machine, and that these factors proximately
caused the injury in question.218 Therefore, if the plaintiff can establish
that his injury was proximately caused by the manufacturer's negligence,
or by its failure to warn of a possible malfunction, an actionable claim will
lie.
When it is suspected that plaintiff's "awareness" was caused by equip-
ment failure, the attorney must secure the machine service records as
soon as possible to prevent potential tampering.219 The attorney should
also familiarize himself with any voluntary product performance stan-
dards that have been developed by the product manufacturers and anes-
thetic clinicians to determine whether an action will lie.2 2 °
VI. ANESTHESIOLOGISTS CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM LAWSUITS
Apart from good medical practice, the best way for anesthesiologists to
stay out of court is through proper communication with their patients
before and after the operation.221 In an interview of over one hundred
patients who were "aware" during surgery, nearly all claimed legal pro-
214. Landis, supra note 208.
215. Id.
216. 758 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
217. Id. at 871, 873.
218. Id. at 873.
219. Todaro & Todaro, supra note 6, at 38.
220. Id. at 39.
221. Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 287.
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ceedings could have been avoided had someone: (1) informed them of
the risk before the operation; (2) talked to them after the surgery about
their experience; and, (3) provided them with an explanation or an
apology.222
Prior to the operation, the anesthesiologist may want to inform the pa-
tient of the possibility of experiencing "awareness" for two reasons. First,
a full and complete disclosure of the risks inherent in anesthesia better
protects the anesthesiologist from future lawsuits by insulating himself
from a claim that the patient did not consent to the possibility of being
"aware" during the operation. 223 Second, most patient anxiety stenning
from the surgery arises from the fear that something must be terribly
wrong because the awareness is completely unexpected.224 The patient
may be more relaxed and less traumatized if he or she knows that being
aware is possible, and not unusual.22 5 The anesthesiologist should, there-
fore, inform his patient of this possibility except when valid reasons for
not doing so are present.226 In that event, the anesthesiologist should
clearly document the reasons for non-disclosure in the patient's chart.22 7
If a suit should arise, the documentation would help the anesthesiologist
prove the reasons for not administering the proper anesthetic dosage.
Informing the patient of the possibility of "awareness" is even more
important in those situations when there is a greater likelihood of
"awareness" occurring. One such situation is when the patient exhibits
specific factors that are associated with greater chances of "awareness,"
such as high preoperative anxiety, obesity, chronic use of sedatives, or
alcoholism. 228 The other situation arises when the operation is one that is
more likely to lead to "awareness," such as Caesarian sections, surgery to
correct cardiovascular instability requiring light anesthesia, and open
heart surgery.229
During the surgery, if the anesthesiologist suspects the patient may be
222. Bennett, supra note 65, at 13; Aitkenhead, supra note 8, at 351; Guerra, supra note
37, at 92-94, 96.
223. See discussion supra Part V(C).
224. See Guerra, supra note 37, at 95.
225. Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 287.
226. Id. Valid reasons for not informing the patient of the risk of "awareness" include
the "therapeutic privilege" and the "emergency circumstance." See supra notes 192-95 and
accompanying text.
227. Id.
228. BENNO BONKE ET AL., MEMORY AND AWARENESS IN ANESTHESIA 212 (1989); De-
siderio, supra note 25, at 186.
229. BONKE ET AL., supra note 228, at 212.
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"aware," talking to the patient, reassuring him, and increasing the anes-
thetic dosage as needed to rectify the situation may be advisable.23° As
many anesthesiologists now know,
[o]ne can never be 100 percent sure that a patient is completely
anaesthetized and not aware. Therefore, care should at all times
be taken of the possibility that the patient is registering stimuli.
In case of a suspected awakening during anaesthesia, or un-
wanted lightening, address the patient directly and try to estab-
lish contact. There is nothing worse than lying down,
presumably anaesthetized, and unable to utter a word or move
an eyelid. An occasional word of encouragement and a pat on
the cheek will show that you are calm and relaxed, and aware of
what is going on and that therefore the patient is supposed to be
in this state, even if he is conscious and aware of the ongoing
surgery.23'
After the surgery, if the patient claims he was aware, the anesthesiolo-
gist should allow the patient to discuss what he experienced and felt.2 32
The anesthesiologist should solicit specific facts from the patient to assure
that he was really aware and not dreaming. 233 The anesthesiologist
should not be defensive or reluctant to hear what the patient has to
say.23 Denial may lead the patient to be even more anxious, depressed,
or enraged.235 In addition, telling the patient he could not have been
"aware" may be emotionally harmful because it may lead the patient to
236 intbegin doubting his own sanity. This in turn may lead to traumatic neu-
rosis and PTSD.2 37
Once the patient proves he was "aware," by recalling specific conversa-
tions or details from the operation that an ordinary anesthetized patient
would not know,238 the anesthesiologist should give the patient a straight-
230. Id.
231. Id. at 213 (citing R.S. Blacher, Awareness During Surgery, 61 ANESTHESIOLOGY 1,
2 (1984)).
232. Id. at 212.
233. Ghoneim & Block, supra note 3, at 287.
234. Guerra, supra note 37, at 91.
235. Id.
236. Utting, supra note 20, at 173.
237. Id.; see also J.M. Cundy, Early Intervention in Treatment of Post-Anesthetic Aware-
ness Stress Disorders, in MEMORY AND AWARENESS IN ANESTHESIA, supra note 1, at 343,
343 (stating that studies have shown that a formal debriefing session on the day after the
disaster has value in placing people's perceptions into a logical framework which may pre-
vent the development of PTSD). Also, early intervention may prevent the later develop-
ment of an acute stress disorder. Id. at 343-45.
238. Heneghan, supra note 20, at 8.
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forward explanation and acknowledge the possibility that "awareness"
occurred.239 Most importantly, however, the anesthesiologist should
show empathy with the patient's sense of hopelessness during the
operation.24 °
By sympathizing with and believing the patient, the anesthesiologist
may be able to relieve the patient's fear of becoming insane, and avoid
exacerbating the patient's traumatic experience. Only open and sincere
conversations with the patient will reduce the risk of a lawsuit by a pa-
tient who experienced "awareness.",241 With communication, the patient
may appreciate the anesthesiologist's sincerity, humanity, and fallibility,
and decide not to sue.
VII. CONCLUSION
"Awareness" during anesthesia may be the worst experience of the pa-
tient's life. The experience of being awake yet paralyzed, and of perceiv-
ing pain while being helpless to react, is a profound trauma.242 Such a
horrifying experience can be truly characterized as an undeserved cruel
and unusual punishment.243 The punishment, however, does not end with
the surgery. After surgery, the patient may re-experience symptoms of
the traumatic ordeal through nightmares and intrusive memories, and
may also exhibit coping problems evidenced by emotional numbing, for-
getfulness, and avoidance of responsibilities. 244
Because the possibility of patient awareness has become better known
in the last decade,245 it should be easier for an attorney to argue that the
anesthesiologist should have been alert to the possibility of patient
awareness. This expectation would, therefore, require the anesthesiolo-
gist to routinely check for symptoms of light anesthesia and continually
abide by the newest guidelines and procedures.
It is essential for anesthesiologists to live up to the high standard of
239. Bonke, supra note 228, at 214.
240. Id.
241. McLeskey & Aitkenhead, supra note 5, at 19.
242. Macleod & Maycock, supra note 26, at 379.
243. See George P. Smith, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safeguarding
Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 12 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 38 (1995) (discussing cruel and unusual punishment in the context
of administering futile medical treatment).
244. Macleod & Maycock, supra note 26, at 379.
245. Growing recognition of patient awareness is evidenced by the increase in articles
and commentaries on the subject in medical journals, and as documented by anesthesiol-
ogy organizations. See McLeskey & Aitkenhead, supra note 5, at 19.
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care expected of them. Only through the threat of litigation will better
anesthetic practice arrive. Those anesthesiologists who meet the requisite
standard of care, and who meticulously stay informed of new develop-
ments in their field, have nothing to lose.
Tal S. Grinblat*
* This comment is made possible by the generous help of Jeanette Tracy and Prof.
George P. Smith.
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